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Summary
A key challenge for evolutionary biologists is to determine
conditions under which individuals benefit from a contribu-
tion to public goods [1, 2]. For humans, it has been observed
that punishment of free riders may promote contributions
[3, 4], but the conditions that lead to stable cooperation
based on punishment remain hotly debated [5–8]. Here we
present empirical evidence that public goods may emerge
as a by-product of self-serving punishment in interactions
between coral reef fishes and parasitic saber-tooth blennies
that stealthily attack their fish victims from behind to take
a bite [9]. We first show that chasing the blenny functions
as punishment [10], because it decreases the probability of
future attacks. We then provide evidence that in female
scalefin anthias, a shoaling species, punishment creates
a public good because it increases the probability that the
parasite switches to another species for the next attack. A
final experiment suggests that punishment is nevertheless
self-serving because blennies appear to be able to discrimi-
nate between look-alike punishers and nonpunishers. Thus,
individuals that do contribute to the public good may risk
being identified by the parasite as easy targets for future
attacks.
Results and Discussion
Cooperation in groups is difficult to explain because individual
contributions are shared among group members, a condition
that is often vulnerable to free riding [1, 2]. Free riders benefit
from the contribution of others but do not contribute them-
selves, and they therefore gain higher payoffs than contribu-
tors do. Two main solutions have emerged in studies on
humans. First, contributions to public goods can be stable if
players may gain a positive reputation from contributing,
which increases the probability of receiving help in other situ-
ations [11–13]. Second, humans may achieve stable coopera-
tion in n-player games if players are allowed to punish
cheaters [4]. Empirical evidence for the success of punishment
even in one-off interactions has led to a heated theoretical
discussion about which conditions such punishment may
evolve from. Models of ‘‘cultural group selection’’ [5, 6]
propose that fast social learning within groups stabilizes
punishment against the problem of so-called second-order
free riding (contributing to public goods but failing to pay for
the punishment of free riders). Others have pointed out that
punishment in one-shot games can only evolve as a result of
indirect fitness benefits [7, 8].
For a better understanding of the conditions that lead to
stable punishment, it seems to be of paramount importance*Correspondence: andrea.bshary@unine.chto identify more natural conditions in which punishment
occurs and to identify the consequences of punishment on
an individual’s fitness. For example, under natural conditions
it seems more likely that individuals interact repeatedly.
Repeated interactions may create conditions in which, at least
in theory, individuals may gain direct benefits from punish-
ment, even if it creates a public good. The empirical evidence
from experiments on humans is mixed in the sense that in
some studies, punishing individuals gain more money than
the average nonpunishing individual, whereas other studies
find the opposite [14–19]. The cited studies differ from each
other with respect to many parameters such as group size,
information about the behavior of others, payoff structure,
strategic options, and ethnic membership, making it difficult
to draw general conclusions. Here we explore the possibility
that punishment yields direct benefits in an animal system in
which field observations suggest that the likelihood of punish-
ment depends on both a repeated game structure and group
size [9]. In our study system, saber-tooth blennies stealthily
attack other reef fish species from behind to take a bite of
mucus, scales, and/or tissue [20]. The blennies occupy small
territories, and resident victim species that repeatedly interact
with the same blenny often chase blennies in response to bites
[9]. In contrast, visiting species that may simply swim beyond
a blenny’s range typically never chase blennies but swim off
[9], suggesting that an enforced repeated game structure is
essential for the emergence of residents chasing blennies.
We tested first whether chasing a blenny functions as
punishment sensu Clutton-Brock and Parker [10]: the imme-
diate reduction in payoffs due to the costs of chasing the
blenny might be offset by the blenny seeking alternative
victims in the future. If that was the case, we asked what the
consequences of punishment on the parasite’s behavior might
be if the punisher was a member of a shoaling species. Many
resident victim species live in aggregations, raising the ques-
tion of whether conspecificsmay also benefit from the chasing
done by a group member. This would be the case if punish-
ment increases the probability that a blenny switches to
a different victim species for its future attacks. We addressed
this question on one particular shoaling resident species, sca-
lefin anthias Pseudanthias squamipinnis. Individuals of this
species frequently chase blennies [9], an observation that
cannot be explained with kin selection as a potential mecha-
nism because it has been demonstrated that anthias groups
lack any kin structure [21]. Therefore, punishment has to
increase the direct fitness of punishers even in this shoaling
species. One possible explanation is that blennies select for
stable punishment because they discriminate between look-
alikes, where one individual punishes and another one does
not. We tested this hypothesis experimentally.
Does Aggression Function as Punishment?
To test whether aggression reduces the probability of being
selected again as a victim, we let 18 blennies feed off of two
differently colored Plexiglas plates: one was invariably
retrieved in response to the blenny taking a bite, whereas the
other one invariably chased the blenny in response to
taking a bite. After training, three naive persons presented
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Figure 1. Punishment Creates a Public Good
The probabilities that blennies switch to another victim species for their next
attack, depending on whether a female anthias chased or did not chase the
blenny in the previous interaction. Black: data on one blenny studied in
detail for 16 hr. White: data on 17 blennies, median and interquartiles of indi-
vidual mean values.
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blenny at equal distance and scored what the blenny chose,
without any further chasing. Blennies attacked the fleeing
plate significantly more often than the chasing plate, no matter
whether the chasing had been done by hand or in a more stan-
dardized way with a machine (sign test: handheld plate: n = 8
individuals, x = 0, p = 0.008; machine used to standardize
chasing: n = 10 individuals, x = 1, p = 0.02).
These data demonstrate that chasing may function as
punishment: the apparent reduction in immediate payoffs of
both actor (through energetic expenditure) and recipient
(through energetic expenditure and risk of injury) yields future
benefits to the actor, because the act alters future behavior of
the recipient. In our case, the blenny will preferentially seek
other victims. Clear demonstrations of punishment have hith-
erto been rare in animals (but see [22–24]) because it is often
difficult to exclude the fact that immediate benefits drive the
behavior. In our case, aggression does not yield immediate
benefits because blennies almost always bite only once
during an attack and retreat even without any reaction of their
victim [9].
Does Punishment Create a Public Good in Locally
Abundant Species?
To test whether chasing the blenny can create a public good in
shoaling fishes, we observed 17 blennies in the field. We
concentrated our observations on the females of a locally
abundant species, scalefin anthias, P. squamipinnis, to get
a sufficient amount of data of one species. We compared the
percentage of the blennies switching to another species if
they were aggressively chased with the percentage of switch-
ing without any aggressive response of the victim.
Overall, chasing the blenny increased the probability that it
switched to another species for its next attack both in
a detailed sample on one blenny (X2 test, n = 256 interactions
following a female anthias-blenny interaction, X2 = 9.2, df = 1,
p = 0.0024, Figure 1) and when we compared mean switching
probabilities of several blennies after being aggressed and
after not being aggressed by a female anthias (Wilcoxon
signed ranks test, n = 17 blennies, z = 22.059, p = 0.039,
Figure 1).
These data suggest that all members of a shoal of look-
alikes profit from the chasing done by an individual fish.
Punishment by one individual thus appears to create a public
good in shoaling species. In line with this assessment,
a between-species comparison revealed a slightly negative
correlation between local abundance and likelihood of chasing
saber-tooth blennies [9]. Nevertheless, the creation of a public
good does not lead to a breakdown of punishment, neither in
scalefin anthias nor in other resident aggregating species [9].
Therefore, the question arises of what factors may cause
that punishment to remain self-serving, even if it additionally
creates a public good. One possibility is that the punisher
gets a larger proportion of the benefits than other group
members [25]. This logic has been proposed in the framework
of ‘‘group augmentation’’ [26]. This concept proposes that
individuals may benefit from helping other group members
because their own reproductive success is linked to the
survival of these group members. The concept was developed
to explain apparently unconditional individual contributions to
vigilance and pup feeding inmeercats [27, 28]. Indeed, individ-
uals contribute most to group benefitting activities when they
are satiated, and they therefore benefit disproportionally from
activities other than foraging. More generally, it has beennoted that both by-product mutualism [29], in which an indi-
vidual shows a self-serving behavior that benefits others as
a by-product, and pseudoreciprocity [30], in which an individ-
ual’s investment causes self-serving responses that benefit
the investor as a by-product, may explain cooperation
in situations in which more than one individual benefits from
helping [31, 32].
Could Blenny Foraging Decisions Select for Stable
Punishment Even in Large Groups?
In a laboratory experiment, we tested whether blennies are
able to identify free riders. We used four plates (see Figure S1A
available online) to present look-alike pairs (mimicking
conspecifics) and a different-looking individual (mimicking an
allospecific) in a counterbalanced design across individual
blennies. Each blenny was confronted with a 100% punishing
plate, a look-alike 0% punishing ‘‘free riding’’ plate, and
a different-looking plate that punished a foraging bite of the
blenny with 50% probability. In each trial, two plates were pre-
sented simultaneously, and the blenny was allowed to take
a single bite. Depending on its choice, this would either lead
to a punishment action followed by removal of both plates or
to immediate removal of both plates. The three possible
combinations in which two plates could be presented pairwise
were counterbalanced across trials. Our construction, to
which the lever of the plate was attached, allowed a standard-
ized movement of the plate of fixed direction and distance to
punish a blenny (Figure S1B).
Under these conditions, blennies generally preferred the
nonpunishing plate over its look-alike 100% punishing plate
(Wilcoxon signed rank test, n = 8, Z = 22.38, p = 0.017). Three
out of eight blennies met our learning criteria for a significant
preference to attack the nonpunishing plate when presented
together with the 100% punishing look-alike plate within
a maximum of 80 joint presentations (Figure 2). In addition,
we found that blennies generally preferred the two look-alike
plates over the different-looking plate. They significantly
preferred the nonpunishing plate over the 50%punishing plate
(Wilcoxon signed rank test, n = 8, Z = 22.52, p = 0.012, Fig-
ure 3), and there was a nonsignificant tendency that the
Figure 2. BlenniesMay Discriminate between Punishers and
Free Riders
The probabilities for eight blennies to take a bite from the
nonpunishing plate when paired with the look-alike 100%
punishing plate over a maximum of eight series of ten trials
each. Bold lines: individual blennies that fulfilled our criteria
for significant preference for the nonpunishing plate. Dashed
line: expected value if blennies do not discriminate between
plates. For the experimental setup of experiment 2, see also
Figure S1.
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punishing plate (Wilcoxon signed rank test, n = 8, Z = 21.82
p = 0.069, Figure 3).
The results demonstrate that at least some blennies may be
able to learn to discriminate between punishers and nonpun-
ishers and then selectively bite nonpunishers. Their foraging
decision rules would then select against nonpunishing individ-
uals and hence select against free riders. In addition, the
results suggest that blennies generally prefer more-abundant
victim types over rarer ones. In this respect, the blennies act
like many predators: it is textbook knowledge that predators
may select prey disproportionally to its abundance either
because predators develop search images or because they
prefer to frequent the habitat of abundant prey species [33].
The blennies’ preference for abundant victim types could
strongly interfere with their willingness to switch from
frequently punishing but abundant species to rarely punishing
species that occur at low densities. Nevertheless, we note that
there are far more individual fish in the reef than the number of
plates we used in our experiment. Thus, the challenge blennies
face under natural conditions appears to be more cognitively
demanding. On the other hand, it might still be easier for
a blenny to distinguish between fish than between plates. In
addition, in nature, blennies could simply stay close to a non-
punishing individual for repeated attacks and thereby selectagainst free riders, whereas such a blenny
strategy was excluded in our experiment because
the plates were removed after each attack.
In summary, our various results demonstrate
that aggression by victims functions as punish-
ment because it increases the probability that
saber-tooth blennies select alternative victimsduring future attacks. In this respect, our experiments in which
we usedPlexiglas plates seem to corroborate well with our field
observations. Punishment is likely to produce a public good in
shoaling species because blennies are likely to switch to other
victim species. In our victim study species, there is no kin struc-
ture [21] that could explain why individuals punish, though they
provide a public good [7, 8]. More generally, kin structures will
rarely exist in reef fish species, because the vast majority of
them are open-water spawners with pelagic egg and larval
stages, which creates a mixed population structure [34, 35].
Therefore, direct benefits of the observed punishment are
needed to explain the persistence of the public good. The
reason why contributions to the public good appear to be self-
serving is that the common enemy selects for the contribution
in our system. Free riders risk being identified as easy targets
for future attacks by the blenny, and avoiding this risk may
compensate for the costs of chasing, thereby selecting against
free riding. Strictly speaking, contributions to the public good
are therefore not a case of cooperation, because individuals
are selected to punish completely independently of the positive
effects their behavior might have on conspecifics [31]. Never-
theless, by-product effects may be important starting points
for the evolution of more sophisticated helping behaviors [36].
Our study system differs in a key factor from standard game
theoretic experiments on human groups: in each round, theFigure 3. Blennies Prefer Abundant Victim Types
The percentages with which blennies took a bite from the
plate that punished with 50% probability when presented
with a different-looking plate that either punished with 0%
probability or with 100% probability. Median and interquar-
tiles of mean values for eight different blennies are pre-
sented. Dashed line: expected value if blennies do not
discriminate between plates.
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own choice, whereas in many human experiments, all group
members interact simultaneously [3, 4, 14, 16–18, 37]. As
a consequence, it is always clear which individual of a shoal
has to punish the blenny for its cheating. A victim cannot
expect others to do the punishment, because they did not
have a negative experience. We think that such conditions
often apply to humans as well, in which punishment is a self-
serving response to being cheated while benefiting the
community as well. A person whose house gets broken into
or who gets attacked by robbers will have to take action (call
the police/fight back) even though all the neighbors may profit
from this. This self-serving scenariomight explainwhy humans
‘‘erroneously’’ punish free riders in a public goods game in
which, in each round, a single individual is randomly selected
to obtain the opportunity to punish other group members,
even though punishment is costly, because group composi-
tion changes every round [38]
Supplemental Information
Supplemental Information includes Supplemental Experimental Procedures
and one figure and can be found with this article online at doi:10.1016/j.cub.
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